Security — NexusRDM
Last updated: July 12, 2026 · All security pages · Privacy · Source
Summary: A local RDP/SSH connection manager. Passwords live in Windows Credential Manager and never touch the app's database or logs. The one caveat is a brief plaintext exposure while launching an external client.
Attack surface
- Outbound only, to the hosts you configure — RDP/SSH sessions, the Proxmox REST API of a cluster you register, and LAN discovery/ping sweeps you initiate.
- On demand, it downloads the FreeRDP and PuTTYNG client binaries from their official GitHub releases if they aren't already present.
- No inbound listener, no telemetry, and no update "phone-home."
- Store package capabilities:
internetClient,privateNetworkClientServer,runFullTrust, andallowElevation(used by the optional Hyper-V helper, which requests administrator rights).
Secrets & data at rest
- Passwords, SSH key passphrases, and API token secrets are stored in Windows Credential Manager, protected at rest by Windows' per-user encryption. They are never written to the app's SQLite database or its logs — the database only holds a reference to the credential entry.
- Brief plaintext at launch: to start an external client, a password is momentarily handled in the clear —
- SSH (PuTTY): written to a temporary file that is locked to your user account and deleted right after PuTTY starts.
- RDP (FreeRDP): passed on the FreeRDP command line, which can be visible to other processes on the machine (e.g. via
tasklist) for the moment the client launches.
- Local logs and a crash log live under
%LocalAppData%\NexusRDM\and do not contain your passwords.
Running it safely
- On a shared or multi-user machine, be aware of the momentary FreeRDP command-line exposure; prefer machines where you're the only user for sensitive RDP credentials.
- The downloaded FreeRDP/PuTTY binaries come from official GitHub releases — verify them if your threat model calls for it.
Reporting
Found an issue? See how to report a vulnerability or email gus@guscatalano.com.